German forces in southern Russia had to react quickly to avoid being overrun by Red Army columns that were fanning out westwards from Stalingrad. Supply dumps and Luftwaffe air bases were hastily evacuated and small ad hoc battlegroups were formed to defend an improvised defensive line along the River Chir, to allow a rescue force for Stalingrad to be assembled. This desperate last line of resistance also protected the vital Morosowskaja and Tatsinskaja airfields, which were to be used by the Luftwaffe to fly in supplies to the Sixth Army after Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, promised that his airmen could fly in the 508 tonnes (500 tons) of supplies a day needed to keep the troops in Stalingrad fighting.

Operation Winter Tempest

The man given the job of saving the Stalingrad garrison was Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. He was considered the best operational-level commander in the Wehrmacht. In 18 months of action on the Eastern Front, he had developed an uncannily accurate "feel" for when Soviet offensives would run out of steam. Like a cunning chess player, he was able to look several moves ahead and build plans for devastating counterattacks.

Manstein set up the headquarters for his newly formed Army Group Don on 27 November, and began calling in all available panzer divisions for the Stalingrad rescue mission, codenamed Operation Winter Tempest. A simultaneous breakout plan was developed for the Sixth Army under the codename Thunderclap. The trapped army, however, only had enough fuel for its remaining tanks to strike 32km (20 miles) westwards, so everything depended on the rescue force punching through the Russian lines, virtually up to the outskirts of Stalingrad. Two fresh panzer divisions were to be mustered for the operation from France and northern Russia, along with a pair of panzer divisions drafted from the southern Caucasus front.

Situation at the front

Out on the freezing steppe, Manstein's grand plans had to be turned into reality by small groups of cold, tired and hungry men. Surviving the winter cold was just as much of a challenge as keeping the Russians at bay. The key battles were fought not to win the generals some "line on a map", but to control precious shelter. A unit left out in the open at night could die in its tracks. Unlike the year before outside Moscow, the Wehrmacht was now prepared for the winter and special warm clothing had been issued. Even with this equipment, however, soldiers could not spend more than half an hour outside shelter on guard duty at night without suffering fatal frostbite or exposure, while vehicles and heavy weapons had to be kept running and maintained 24 hours a day to stop them freezing solid. In the East during the winter, some of the most important pieces of equipment in the Wehrmacht's arsenal were its field kitchens. The delivery of hot food to frontline positions did a lot to sustain morale in truly desperate conditions, and kept men fighting beyond normal levels of endurance. Violent snowstorms could engulf units for days on end, preventing any kind of movement. One of the few benefits of the Russian winter was that it froze up the rivers and streams that criss-crossed the steppe, allowing the panzers to manoeuvre freely.

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