The Soviet Sixth Guards Army

In II SS Panzer Corps' sector, the Soviet Sixth Guards Army created what was intended to be a death trap for the Waffen-SS men. Facing the brunt of the German attack were the soldiers of the 67th and 52nd Guards Rifle Divisions. They manned a series of strongpoints along a ridge line, which allowed them to observe the approach routes to the southern shoulder of the Kursk salient and call down massive barrages of artillery and multi-barrel Katyusha rocket launcher (the so-called Stalin's Organ) fire on German assembly areas. Two antitank regiments and two tank regiments were spread out among the first-echelon divisions to stiffen their resistance. The tanks and anti-tank guns were emplaced in bunkers to protect them from shell fire. Along the front were some 290km (181 miles) of trench lines. Hundreds of kilometres of anti-tank ditches were dug to channel the German attack towards tank-killing zones. More than 1000 machine-gun nests and mortar batteries were positioned to cover the mine belts, to stop German combat engineers clearing paths through the 140,000 mines. Some 300 pillboxes and over 3000 individual bunkers protected several thousand riflemen and tank-hunting squads armed with anti-tank rifles. Some 9.6km (6 miles) behind the main defence line were three infantry divisions, a tank brigade and two more regiments of anti-tank guns. They had prepared similarly strong defence lines to their comrades in the frontline, although the mine belts were thinner with only 30,000 mines. Throughout the Sixth Guards Army's sector, there were more than 400 anti-tank guns between 45mm and 76mm calibre, some 778 mortars and almost 500 artillery pieces between 76mm and 203mm calibre. They were all in prepared positions, and their target-spotting teams had had three months to pre-register ranges and targets.

Defence in depth

Nearly 48km (30 miles) behind the front were the so-called rear-defence lines, which were sited on a number of key rivers, blocking the advance to Kursk itself. These contained a far higher density of mines, machine guns, mortars and anti-tank guns than in the second line. Not content with this density of fortification, Zhukov ordered another defensive sector - of three lines - to be built at the the base of salient, in case the Germans punched through the initial defence lines. To add to the Germans' problems, all the construction work on the Soviet defensive positions was to be conducted at night or under camouflage nets so Luftwaffe photographic reconnaissance would not be able to pinpoint them. Hundreds of dummy trench lines, bunkers and minefields were also prepared to confuse German intelligence. When the Germans attacked they would have little idea of the real tactical layout of the Russian positions, beyond what they could see from their own trenches.

From the Lucy Ring reports and tactical intelligence from prisoners and deserters, Zhukov knew almost to the hour when the German assault would begin. The Soviet commander, however, was far from complacent. Once the battle started he knew that anything could happen.

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