The last 160km (100 miles) of the River Mius flow almost exactly along a north-south course into the Gulf of Taganrog. The German "new" Sixth Army had been defending this line since the spring, with 10 understrength infantry divisions and a single weak panzergrenadier division. The Mius was the last natural obstacle before the great River Dnieper, and Hitler believed it was the key to protecting the Ukraine's natural resources and industrial potential from the Red Army.

The Mius position

In mid-July 1943 the river was reduced to barely a trickle. It was only some 50m (164ft) wide and a few centimetres deep. The Sixth Army had spent almost six months building up its defences on the high ground on the western bank, but the 12.8km- (8-mile-) long slope up from the river meant the German positions were dangerously exposed to Russian observation and artillery fire. The high ground was featureless, with only a handful of small villages and ravines providing any protection from artillery fire. However, huge wheat fields with nearly ripe crops covered the slopes, making it very easy for infantrymen to disappear from view. Along the river bank there was little cover, and the only way for the Germans to protect themselves was to dig deep trench lines and bunkers. They also planted numerous minefields to channel any attacks into killing zones. In the run-up to Operation Citadel, the Mius Front was a backwater, with few reinforcement troops and tanks being sent to help bolster the Sixth Army. It had much in common with the fictional section of the Eastern Front portrayed in the 1977 Sam Peckinpah movie, Cross of Iron.

Soviet plans

The Soviet High Command had great plans for the Mius Front. They saw it as a key pressure point to draw away the German panzer reserves if their front around Kursk was ever seriously threatened. In a classic campaign of maskirovka, or deception, they carried out all the preparations for their Mius offensive in full view of the Germans. Tank and truck convoys moved into position at night with headlights on. Radio conversations detailing attack plans were made with no attempt to encode secret information. Artillery positions were set up in the open and stockpiles of ammunition were not hidden. As the giant tank battle at Prokhorovka reached its climax, the Soviets ordered their troops on the Mius to attack. There were tank reserves on hand to exploit any breakthrough, but the incursion would, hopefully, panic the Germans into moving panzers away from the decisive front. Tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers would die in the coming weeks to satisfy the Soviet master deception plan.

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