Rommel threw himself into his mission with a vengeance, setting a punishing schedule of inspection visits around France and trips to the Führer's headquarters in East Prussia to secure more men and resources for his command. He spent hours locked in fruitless meetings with Hitler to secure backing for his counter-invasion strategy. From his experience in North Africa and Italy, Rommel believed that the Allies had to be defeated on the landing beaches, otherwise they would be able to consolidate a bridgehead and bring their overwhelming superiority in materiel to bear against the thinly stretched German defenders. Rommel believed he would have little chance in a war of attrition in France. Any invasion would have to be smashed within 24 hours, so the panzer divisions should be based close to the coast, ready to strike.

Rommel versus von Rundstedt

Rommel's immediate superior in France, the 71-year-old Gerd von Rundstedt, disagreed, and argued that it would be better to mass all the panzer reserves inland as a huge strike force, and then launch one knock-out blow against the Allied bridgehead. Luftwaffe bombers and Admiral Karl Dönitz's U-boat fleet would also be able to cut Allied supply lines, leaving them isolated in France.

Arguments raged between Rommel and his commander-in-chief. Allied airpower would slaughter the panzer columns as they marched to the coast, said Rommel. The "Desert Fox" had little confidence in German air and seapower being able to influence the coming battle. SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser and SS-Obergruppenführer Josef "Sepp" Dietrich, the commanders of the two SS panzer corps, also weighed in to the argument on the side of Rundstedt. Their experience in Russia told them that a mass attack would have more chance of success. Rommel countered that they had never had to fight under Allied air supremacy.

The lack of intelligence on Allied intentions also complicated Rommel's planning. While most German commanders in France were convinced that the Allies would strike across the Straits of Dover to seize the Pas de Calais, the possibility of an invasion farther west in Normandy could not be excluded.

Hitler wades into the argument

With his generals unable to agree on a common strategy, Hitler not surprisingly was able to force his own plans on the invasion-front commanders. Even though his astrologer told him to expect an invasion in Normandy, Hitler decreed that the bulk of the German forces in the West would be based within striking distance of the Pas de Calais. This included the two SS panzer corps, until II SS Panzer Corps was temporarily dispatched to the Eastern Front in April 1944. He backed Rundstedt's idea of a concentrated counterattack.

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