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1944 - Retreat from Leningrad 1944 - Retreat from Leningrad

Battlefield tactics

Mission command (or auftragstaktik) was at the heart of German Army tactics. Commanders were given an objective to reach and were left to formulate a plan of operation that would achieve the High Command's intent. During both defensive and offensive operations, German commanders would decide where exactly the schwerpunkt (point of main effort) was to be. Once this had been identified, they would concentrate as much of their resources as possible in order to secure it.

In the defensive battles in Normandy, this usually resulted in the Germans trying to hold a key piece of high ground that dominated a large area. Holding the high ground would give an important advantage: devastating artillery as well as tank fire could be brought to bear against the enemy, effecting its retreat.

When the Waffen-SS moved to attack, the same principle was used. However, in their manoeuvres the bulk of the German offensive power would be concentrated against the weakest point in the Allied line. Once success had been achieved, an overwhelming force would be concentrated to reinforce these gains.

The Waffen-SS had learnt on the Eastern Front that its tanks were true battle-winning weapons, in both the attack and defence role, as long as they were concentrated and used en masse. A division's panzer battalion would only be committed to action if it could achieve decisive results. It was not to be wasted away in penny packets, holding ground or on limited attacks. The job of holding ground was to be left to the panzergrenadiers, which were to be supported by the anti-tank units. These two units in turn would often find themselves supported by the flak battalion's 88mm guns, operating in the direct-fire role.

Rethinking the battlefield

Once it had been committed to action, a panzer kampfgruppe would usually boast elements of the SPW battalion, anti-tank guns and self-propelled artillery. This self-contained force would be able to deal with any likely enemy threat and hold ground once the operation had achieved its objective.

On the whole, the experience the Waffen-SS had gained in Russia was invaluable when it came to fighting the relatively inexperienced British and American divisions that had landed in Normandy. However, no matter how much they had learnt, there was one major shortfall: these SS men had never been forced to face massed Allied airpower. The paralyzing effect of the overhead presence of British Typhoons or American Mustangs was to force a rethink by the Waffen-SS commanders. They realized that they would have to change the way they moved their troops around the battlefield. It soon became apparent that the massed tank attacks that had worked so well for them on the Eastern Front were, once executed in the West, very vulnerable to Allied air attacks.

Waffen-SS officers

One thing the Waffen-SS - particularly its officer corps - never lacked in abundance throughout the war was fighting spirit. A major factor in nurturing and maintaining the fighting spirit of the Waffen-SS panzer divisions was their strong sense of unit identity. Both officers and noncommissioned officers alike served almost exclusively in the same regiment or division throughout their time in uniform. They had come to know and trust their comrades in arms, and had shared successes and hardships. Each division also had its own distinct set of characteristics.

 

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